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I. INTRODUCTION
At one time, federalism may have seemed a peculiarly American institution. Today, however, we can see federalism as a special
case of the more general problem of allocating power among geographic units. Problems of federalism arise in structures as large as
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the European Union' and the even larger global trade system under
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT").2
Free trade increasingly is accepted as a value internationally,
as it always has been for commerce within the United States. Yet,
both internationally and domestically, free trade must accommodate
the reality of the modern regulatory state-a state that shows little
tendency to wither away. Regulation often creates competitive disadvantages for foreign producers. Sometimes the disadvantage is intended, but sometimes it is a genuinely unwanted consequence of a
domestic policy. Trade-restricting effects frequently occur even with
facially nondiscriminatory regulations because the different geographic or market positions of foreign producers often make it more
costly to comply with demanding regulations. For example, a rule
mandating particular pollution controls for automobiles can force the
foreign producer to set up a separate production operation in order to
sell in that particular jurisdiction.
When trade between American states is involved, the operative
legal rules on trade-restricting measures are provided by the dormant
Commerce Clause ("DCC"). The Supreme Court has been particularly
vigilant in scrutinizing state laws under this doctrine in recent years. 3
Trade between more than one hundred nations is regulated by a
similar set of legal rules in GATT and its many supplemental
agreements. 4 The GATT agreements contain many specific rules

1.
The entity now known as the "European Union" ("EU) began life in 1957 as the
"European Economic Community" ("EEC"), evolved into the "European Community" or
"European Communities" (both "EC'", and has now again changed its name. Nothing in this
Article requires mastery of this shifting nomenclature.
2.
The original 1947 GATT agreement is cited conventionally in the United States as:
opened for signatureOct. 30 1947, 61 Stat. A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187. The current
text of the 1947 GATT, as amended, is reproduced in Volume IV of the GATr's official document
series, conventionally cited as "Contracting Parties to the General Agreement of Tariffs and
Trade, Basic Instruments and Selected Documents" ("BISD"), last published in 1969. The juridical entity created by the 1947 GATT agreement as amended is scheduled to be replaced by a
new entity, called "GATT 1994." This entity, joined together with the other supplemental
agreements negotiated in the 1986-93 Uruguay Round negotiations, will serve as the legal
framework for the new World Trade Organization ("WTO") that was also created by those
negotiations. GATT 1994 itself will have the same substantive text as the current 1947 GATT.
GATT provisions, 1947 or 1994, will be cited simply as: "GATT Article
."
The BISD series, which in addition to "Volumes" containing basic texts, is issued in annual
Supplements. These will be cited as "BISD, _ Supp."
3.
See David O'Brien, The Supreme Court and Intergovernmental Relations: What Happened to "OurFederalism?",9 J. L. & Pol. 609, 629-33 (1993).
4.
The law of the European Union also contains an extensive body of DCC-like doctrine
under Articles 30 and 36 of the Treaty of Rome, an even richer body of experience for an indepth comparative study. See generally Donald P. Kommers and Michel Waelbroeck, Legal Integrationand the Free Movement of Goods: The American and European Experiences,in Mauro
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regulating certain types of trade barriers. The GATT agreements also
contain a number of DCC-like prescriptions, prohibiting national
regulatory measures that constitute "unnecessary obstacles to international trade"5 or a "disguised restriction on international trade."6
While GATT case law is not as fully developed as DCC law, recent
decisions and negotiations have begun to elaborate it sufficiently to
permit comparisons.
In this Article, we will consider the DCC in comparison with
the GATT legal system.7 We believe enough commonalty exists to
justify an effort at a comparative treatment. Both legal systems are
struggling with the same basic difficulties. The modern regulatory
state inevitably produces burdens on trade, if only because of the
unavoidable lack of regulatory uniformity. For various reasons, many
of these burdens likely are unwarranted, and at least some are in fact
due to protectionist efforts by local industries. Yet, tribunals have
only a limited warrant to override the policy choices of local legislatures. Tribunals must accord respect to the democratic process as
well as to the prerogatives (or sovereignty) of local governments. To
be sure, DCC law and GATT law operate in two quite different political and institutional settings, not to mention the different paths of
legal evolution that have brought them to this point. But that is what
makes the comparison interesting.8
We begin in Part II by considering briefly the basis for the
quasi-constitutional legal protection of free trade, and the central
tensions implicit in that legal mandate. In Part III, we explore the
existing legal rules applicable to trade-restricting regulatory measures, first under DCC doctrine, then under GATT. Although some of
our discussion of DCC doctrine may be familiar to constitutional
scholars, we believe that lower court developments are noteworthy

Cappelletti, Monica Seccombe and Joseph Weiler, eds., 1 Integration Through Law, Book 3,
Forces and Potentialfor a European Identity 165 (Walter de Gruyter, 1986).
5. The quotation is from Article 2.2 of the revised GATT Standards Code, as adopted at the
conclusion of the Uruguay Round. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, in Final Act
Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, done at Marrakesh on April 15, 1994, at page 117. The new Uruguay Round Standards Code will be cited
hereinafter as "1994 GATT StandardsCode." The entire Final Act will be cited hereinafter as
"1994 GATT FinalAct."
6.
The term comes originally from the preamble to GATT Article XX. See note 64.
7.
In particular, we will focus on the application of the DCC to regulations. There is another, quite complex body of law covering state taxation of interstate commerce.
8.
This comparison is interesting enough to modify the views of one of the authors regarding the DCC. Compare the views expressed in this article with those in Daniel A. Farber,
State Regulation and the DormantCommerce Clause, 3 Const. Comm. 395 (1986).
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and less well-known. 9 Similarly, the GATT material is unfamiliar to
many American legal scholars. In Part IV, we summarize our conclusions from this comparative examination. We suggest that lack of
clarity may be a necessary characteristic of legal doctrines wrestling
with the opposing forces in this area, and offer a map of the small
area of firm ground available to legal tribunals.
II. FREE TRADE AS A SUBJECT FOR LEGAL PROTECTION
A. Why ConstitutionalizeFree Trade?
The DCC can be considered a weak form of constitutional law
-constitutional inasmuch as it limits the power of state regulators,
weak inasmuch as Congress can resurrect state regulatory power by
legislation. GATT can also be considered quasi-constitutional because
it is designed to channel the ordinary legislative processes of GATT
member governments. Before becoming immersed in the details of
these doctrines, it is important to review the fundamental issue of
why free trade should receive such extraordinary legal protection.
Free trade may be a desirable state of affairs, but so are many
other things that are left to the discretion of governmental units.
Why not leave local units of government, whether American states or
the world's trading nations, with unlimited control over this area?
Why have a GATT or DCC at all?
Economic theory would have no difficulty explaining why free
trade is better-protectionist trade barriers usually hurt the state
imposing them as much or more than they harm trading partners.
But that is not an answer that distinguishes free trade from other
social and economic policy issues. In other areas, we accord legislatures the freedom to choose economically harmful results, including
the freedom to choose the least efficient way to accomplish a particular social objective.
The conventional explanation of the extraordinary legal protection given to free trade policy is that, unlike most other policy measures, trade restrictions cause direct and immediate harm to
"outsiders" who actually are members of the same wider community.
External controls are required, the argument goes, because local units

9.
In our survey of the lower federal courts, we have focused on environmental law,
which is currently a major source of DCC litigation.
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will not properly take into account these harms to other community
members. In a community consisting of several smaller units of government (a United States consisting of individual states, or a GATT
consisting of individual nations), the ultimate question is whether the
gain of the regulation for insiders 0 outweighs the harm it causes to
outsiders.
Local legislatures may be well suited to weigh the
importance of gains in terms of the costs they are willing to pay, but
there is no reason to think they have any capacity to make an honest
weighing of the balance between their own gains and the costs to
outsiders within the larger community. Indeed, human experience
tells us that, in a democracy, they have every reason not to do an
honest job.
The underlying reason for wanting to prevent these harms to
outsiders may simply be the desire to protect community membership.
When states institute regulations that unduly burden nonresidents,
they are failing to accord those nonresidents the measure of respect
due to fellow citizens. This justification also applies to GATT, although to a much weaker degree. Notwithstanding GATT's primary
emphasis on the economic gains from multilateral cooperation, the
postwar initiative that created GATT also rested on a collective perception that ruthless treatment of the economic interests of outsiders
is inconsistent with the conditions of peaceful international society.
The articulated reasons for legal barriers against protectionism usually assign a major role to economic gains that cannot be
achieved by the individual decisions of local units. The argument
resembles a solution to a prisoner's dilemma." Cooperative agreement can improve the welfare of all of the individual states. An enforcement mechanism is required, not because it is in the interest of
each state to defect from the agreement-economists are pretty much
united in the view that it isn't-but because the mercantilist perspective that prevails in most political debate makes it seem so. Thus,
rather than solving a true prisoner's dilemma, free trade agreements
10. When we speak of "gain for insiders," we refer to the tangible economic gains that accrue to the interest groups seeking trade protection. The observation rests on the assumption
that such policy decisions are, in fact, driven by the interests of the groups that benefit from
them, aided by whatever misguided perception of overall national interest may be generated in
support of them. In most cases, of course, economic theory tells us that there will be no welfare
gain to the polity as a whole.
11. A "prisoner's dilemma" is a game-theory situation involving two parties, who must
each decide whether to "cooperate" or "defect." Whatever the other party does, each can always
increase its payoff by defecting rather than cooperating. Neither party can trust the other. As a
result, both defect even when this results in a much lower payoff than joint cooperation. A classic example is an arms race that makes neither side more secure; each would like to quit but
cannot trust the other.
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also partake in the nature of the "public-interest Ulysses" binding
himself to the mast-to avoid responding to the calls of the protectionist Sirens.
By itself, this self-control rationale would not distinguish freefrom similar legal restraints that might be imposed to
rules
trade
prevent other kinds of economically inefficient legislation. Quite
apart from protectionism, legislatures have an innate tendency to
favor concentrated groups of firms at the expense of the general
public. 12 Why institute legal safeguards against protectionism but not
against other forms of special interest legislation? In sum, the reason
for the special treatment accorded to free trade policies comes back to
the protection of outsiders. These outsiders might not need protection
if the economics of free trade carried more political force, but the
political reality is one of mercantilism-and it is that political reality
that creates the semblance of the prisoner's dilemma.
Legal restraints on protectionism have another characteristic
that distinguishes them from legal intervention in other areas of
social and economic policy. Free trade is a more tractable judicial
goal than the typical Lochnerian standards of rationality or economic
efficiency that typically serve as standards for review of other social
and economic laws. Granted that social and economic legislation
often involve noneconomic values, imposition of a free trade standard
need not impair those values. Free trade mandates equal opportunity
for foreign firms. Being a principle of equality, it does not restrict a
state's choice of domestic goals, and narrows the choice of means only
to the extent of requiring even-handedness.
On balance, the long-standing policy to provide special institutional restraints against trade barriers, as opposed to other economic
interventions, can be explained as a rational choice. This more sophisticated understanding of the bases for such a free trade policy has
implications in selecting the standard for DCC cases. It is conventional to distinguish between two possible justifications for the DCC:
free trade as a substantive value, and protection of outsiders as a
process value. The first goal suggests that courts should adopt some
form of cost-benefit analysis, balancing regulatory gains against the
harm to the economic objectives of free trade. The second suggests a
central role for evidence of intent, as in the analogous situation where
the courts protect minority groups against discriminatory legisla-

12. Daniel A. Farber and Philip P. Frickey, Law and Public Choice: A CriticalIntroduction 12-37 (U. of Chicago, 1991).
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tion.13 Process and substance are closely intertwined, however, in the
area of free trade. Free trade is a substantively valuable goal, but
receives legal protection because of process issues, while such protection is feasible, in part, because free trade provides tribunals with a
substantive baseline. Consequently, we will suggest in Part IV that
both cost-benefit balancing and intent should play a role in the analysis.

B. Questions of Legitimacy
As we will detail in Part III, both the international and domestic legal regimes provide procedures for outsiders to challenge government regulations on the ground that they restrict trade unduly.
The legitimacy of both regimes has come under attack. Because of its
lack of textual basis, the legal legitimacy of the DCC has been sharply
questioned by legal scholars. The actual operation of the DCC has
been criticized in terms of the political illegitimacy of judges secondguessing legislatures. In the international arena, where free trade is
the specific object of the operative texts, no question of legal legitimacy arises. But critics of the international regime do question its
political legitimacy, fearing that GATT will inevitably undermine the
"democratic" determination of regulatory policy in important areas
14
such as the environment.
Before turning to these specific complaints, we should explain
why we do not rely on a common response to such attacks. In both
regimes, an adverse ruling does not completely foreclose pursuit of a
regulatory policy. In the DCC context, Congress can implement the
policy itself or authorize the state to do so. Under GATT, political
negotiation or outright disobedience are like alternatives to compliance. These features do mitigate the potentially anti-democratic
effect of both the GATT and DCC. In this Article, however, we place
little normative reliance on them for two reasons. First, we lack any
systematic knowledge of the operation of either one, and they may be
either arbitrary or systematically biased. Second, neither GATT nor
the DCC would be worth the bother if we expected most regulations to
continue despite adverse rulings. Thus, it must be assumed that legal
regimes will, in fact, decisively block local regulatory policies with
some frequency.
13. See Farber, 3 Const. Comm. at 401, 403-06 (cited in note 8).
14. On the competing claims to the legitimizing mantle of "democracy" in this area, see
Robert E. Hudec, "Circumventing"Democracy: The PoliticalMorality of Trade Negotiations, 25
N.Y.U. J. Intl L. & Pol. 311 (1993).
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The challenge to the legal legitimacy of DCC doctrine rests on
its lack of a clear textual basis. The Commerce Clause empowers
Congress to "regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the
several States, and with the Indian Tribes."15 By its terms, it is
purely a grant of legislative power to Congress rather than a restriction on the states. This is in contrast to some other portions of the
Constitution that explicitly limit state power (for instance, in the
areas of tariffs and export fees). A not unreasonable inference could
be that the clause has no direct effect on state regulatory power,
though it indirectly could affect state regulation by providing the
basis for a federal statute, which might in turn preempt state laws.
Indeed, some scholars have forcefully argued that the Commerce
Clause places no limits on state power in the absence of congressional
action.16

It is non-controversial, however, that the Constitution was
intended to promote internal free trade and in particular to eliminate
tariffs between states. GATT (and also EC) experience suggests that
a natural (and perhaps necessary) step toward these goals is
providing a neutral tribunal with jurisdiction over non-tariff trade
barriers. Thus, in the context of other trade-oriented instruments,
the DCC seems less like an anomalous development of U.S. legal
history, and more like a necessary and reasonable inference from the
overall constitutional scheme of political and economic union.
In any event, the formalist objection seems to us to come well
over a century too late. Nor do we accept the fall-back argument that,
17
given its basic illegitimacy, the DCC should be narrowly construed.
Perhaps the DCC should have had a firmer textual basis, but if we
are going to have a DCC at all, there seems little reason to have a
suboptimal set of rules.
The political legitimacy of current DCC doctrine has also been
challenged as an improper exercise of judicial activism. In the postWorld War II era, Justice Black expressed concern that the Court was

15. U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
16. See, for example, Martin H. Redish and Shane V. Nugent, The Dormant Commerce
Clause and the ConstitutionalBalance of Federalism,1987 Duke L. J. 569; Julian N. Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 Yale L. J. 425 (1982).
17. Notably, Justice Scalia (the leading textualist on the Court today) refers to the dormant Commerce Clause as the product of intellectual adverse possession, akin to the ownership
rights that accrue when an individual has occupied land belonging to someone else for a sufficient period of time. Consequently, he argues for a restricted standard of review. Justice
Scalia's critique of the DCC is explained in his concurrence in Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco
Enterprises,Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 895-900 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
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second-guessing valid legislative judgments in DCC cases. 18 More
recently, Justice Scalia also has questioned the legitimacy of much of

modern DCC law:
I do not know what qualifies us to make [the] ultimate (and most ineffable)
judgment as to whether, given importance-level x, and effectiveness-level y,
the worth of the statute is "outweighed" by impact-on-commerce z.... As long
as a State's [law does] not discriminate against out-of-state interests, it should
survive this Court's scrutiny.... Beyond that, it is for Congress to prescribe
its invalidity.' 9

In this distrust of the judicial role in DCC cases (and of balancing in
20
particular), Justice Scalia is joined by a phalanx of scholars.
Even harsher claims currently are being made against the
political legitimacy of present and prospective GATT rules in this
area. The criticisms range from the hysterical to the scholarly. The
former are typified by the well-known "Sabotage" advertisement, a
full-page ad taken out by the Sierra Club, Public Citizen, Greenpeace,
Friends of the Earth, Clean Water Action, and a number of other
smaller environmental groups, that appeared in several national
newspapers in April of 1992.21 The advertisement made the following

claims:
...
President Bush has been pushing for new international trade rules
that give a secretive foreign bureaucracy vast new powers to threaten American laws that protect your food, your health, your wilderness and wildlife, and

your job....
If this new set of trade rules is passed, it could be used against thousands
of laws in countries around the world that give priority to clean food and clean
water, protect sea mammals and wildlife, preserve trees or other resources, re-

18. Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 788 (1945) (Black, J., dissenting); Dean
Milk v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 357 (1951) (Black, J., dissenting).
19. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp., 481 U.S. 69, 95-96 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia expressed a similar view in Bendix Autolite Corp., arguing that the "balancing approach" should be abandoned because it invades the legislative function and is also intellectually incoherent, like 'judging whether a particular line is longer than a particular rock is
heavy." 486 U.S. at 897. The case in which such a judgment can be most comfortably made, we
would observe, is when one of the quantities is zero. It also may be other than nonsensical to
assert that the Earth is heavier than a pin is long- after all, the Earth is very heavy, where a
pin is very short. See text accompanying notes 102-09.
20. For a recent discussion of the scholarship on the subject, see Michael P. Healy, The
Preemptionof State Hazardous and Solid Waste Regulations: The Dormant Commerce Clause
Awakens Once More, 43 J. Urban & Contemp. L. 177 (1993).
21. See, for example, New York Times, B-5C ("Sabotage"). The principal sponsors were
also the plaintiffs in the recent unsuccessful lawsuit calling for the Clinton Administration to
submit an environmental impact statement for NAFTA. See Public Citizen v. United States
Trade Representative,5 F.3d 549 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
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strict poisonous pesticide sprays, save rainforests and safeguard small farmers
from being overpowered by agribusiness....
European laws to stop the sale of beef shot up with carcinogenic growth
hormones like DES, may also have to be harmonized down. That is, eliminated. Japanese laws that keep out dangerous food colorings and dyes, known
Thailand's anti-smoking
to cause cancer, probably won't survive either. And
22
campaign was challenged by the U.S. under GATT.

Setting aside its somewhat misleading factual assertions,23 the
Sabotage advertisement does point to many of the specific concerns
that commentators express repeatedly in this area. GATT has a
number of rules that permit tribunals to invalidate measures as
undue restrictions on trade. In particular, both the new agreement on
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures and the new Standards Code
call for examination of health and product safety standards under
legal standards such as "disguised restriction on international trade"
or "unnecessary obstacles to international trade."24 These new agreements also encourage governments to use broadly-accepted international standards in their regulations, on the ground that uniform
international standards are likely to cause the least trade disruption.2 5 In a country like the United States that has many regulations
more demanding than international standards, this emphasis on international standards leads to fears of pressures to "harmonize
down." Failure to prove the scientific necessity of such high-level
regulations could result in claims of GATT-illegality when the regula-

22. Sabotage (emphasis in original).
23. For example, the EC hormone restriction currently being challenged in GATT does not
deal with DES, a proven carcinogen long ago prohibited, but rather with synthetic copies of
natural hormones that the international food safety organization Codex Alimentarius has so far
found to have no harmful effects at all. See generally Adridn Raphael Halpern, Comment, The
U.S.-EC Hormone Beef Controversy and the StandardsCode: Implicationsfor the Applicationof
Health Regulations to Agricultural Trade, 14 N. C. J. Intl L. & Comm. Reg. 135 (1989); Allen
Dick, Note, The EC Hormone Ban Dispute and the Application of the Dispute Settlement Provisions of the Standards Code, 10 Mich. J. Intl L. 872 (1989). Likewise, the Thailand "anti-

smoking campaign" consisted of prohibiting the importation of foreign cigarettes while the domestic producers of cigarettes, a state enterprise, were increasing production. See Thailand:
Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, BISD, 37th Supp. 200 (1991)

(GATT panel decision upholding U.S. complaint).
24. The term "disguised restriction on international trade," which comes from GATT Article XX, is found in paragraphs 7 and 20 of the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and
PhytosanitaryMeasures ("1994 GATT SPSAgreement"), which was concluded in the GATT Uruguay Round negotiations. The text of the 1994 GATT SPS Agreement is contained in the 1994

GATT FinalAct, II-A1A-4. The term "unnecessary obstacles to international trade" is contained
in Article 2.2 of the 1994 GATT StandardsCode.
25. 1994 GATT SPS Agreement, 9-10.
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tions create differential burdens among foreign sellers.26 The end
result thus might be a weakening of the strict regulations environmental groups have fought long and hard to achieve.27
The central tension in both DCC law and in the parallel GATT
legal regime is the clash between the perceived need to restrain governments from imposing protectionist regulations and the equally
insistent objections to the political legitimacy of doing so. Without
unitary government, we inevitably will be faced with conflicts between these goals of free trade and local autonomy. Part III next
considers how the operative doctrines of both DCC law and GATT law
have attempted to resolve these conflicts.
III. THE LEGAL REGIMES
A. The DormantCommerce Clause
Since the origins of the DCC, the Supreme Court has continually modified its definition of the judicial role in overseeing state
regulation.28 Initially, the Court took the position that no state regulation of interstate commerce was permissible. 9 This position quickly
proved untenable, and the Court then allowed regulation of "local
aspects" of interstate transactions. 30 A reformulation of the doctrine
in the early part of this century attempted to distinguish between
"direct" regulation (impermissible) of interstate commerce and
"indirect" (permissible) regulation.3 1 Finally, in the past fifty years,
26. Paragraph 11 of the 1994 GATT SPS Agreement permits standards higher than international standards, but only on condition that: (1) there is a scientific justification; or (2) that
parties follow a prescribed risk-assessment procedure.
27. Examples of U.S. legislation that might be threatened by such international regulation always begin with the so-called "zero tolerance" standard imposed by the "Delaney Clause"
of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)(A) (1988), which prohibits the
sale of products containing any trace of elements identified as carcinogenic, regardless of how
small or harmless the amount. See Daniel A. Farber, Book Review Essay, Playingthe Baseline:
Civil Rights, Environmental Law, and Statutory Interpretation,91 Colum. L. Rev. 676, 697-98
(1991). The Delaney Clause is a particularly good example of the tensions involved in this area
because, while some defend it as the crowning achievement of the consumer health movement,
others regard it as just the sort of hysterical and overzealous regulation that should be attacked
and struck down by trading partners if we are unable to repeal it ourselves.
28. For historical reviews, see John Nowak and Ronald Rotunda, ConstitutionalLaw 27488 (West, 4th ed. 1991); Noel T. Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State Power, 27 Va. L. Rev.
1, 2-19 (1940).
29. Nowak and Rotunda, ConstitutionalLaw at 275.
30. See Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 Howard) 299 (1851).
31. See Laurence Tribe, ConstitutionalLaw 408 (Foundation, 2d ed., 1988).
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the Court has experimented with various methods of evaluating the
strength of the state's regulatory interest in comparison with the
burden on commerce.
In understanding the Supreme Court's current formulation, it
is useful to distinguish between three types of cases involving state
regulatory measures. 32 The first type involves explicit discrimination
against interstate commerce.3 3 City of Philadelphiav. New Jersey34
illustrates the Court's approach to such statutes. New Jersey faced a
serious shortage of landfill space. To conserve existing space as long
as possible, the legislature prohibited the importation of waste from
other states for disposal in New Jersey. The Supreme Court found
this legislation unconstitutional on its face. "[Whatever New Jersey's
ultimate purpose, it may not be accomplished by discriminating
against articles of commerce coming from outside the State unless
there is some reason, apart from their origin, to treat them differently."3 5 If taken at face value, statements such as this would suggest
that explicit discrimination against interstate commerce is virtually
36
prohibited.
The remaining two categories include cases involving laws that
do not discriminate on their face between in-state and out-of-state
products, but have a visibly burdensome impact on out-of-state producers in practice. In some cases-those in category two-the court
describes the impact as a "discriminatory effect" and places the
burden on the government to prove the necessity of the law. The
doctrine is illustrated by Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising
Commission.37 Federal law provided a system of grades to be used in
labeling apples. North Carolina prohibited the display of any grades
on labels other than those approved by the State. Washington apple
growers brought litigation contending that the Washington grading
system was superior and that North Carolina's ban on the display of
Washington grades impaired the marketability of their apples. The
law did not discriminate on its face against interstate commerce. The
discriminatory effect on Washington apples was sufficient, however,
32. Cases involving state proprietary functions and subsidies belong to yet another category, such laws being generally immune from DCC scrutiny.
33. For further discussion of the earlier discrimination cases, see James F. Blumstein,
Some Intersections of the Negative Commerce Clause and the New Federalism: The Case of Discriminatory State Income Tax Treatment of Out-of-State Tax-Exempt Bonds, 31 Vand. L. Rev.
473, 484, 493-97 (1978).
34. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
35. Id. at 626-27.
36. The Court recognized a minor exception for quarantine laws. Id. at 628-29. As we
shall see in Part IV, the rule has not always been quite this rigorous in practice.

37.

432 U.S. 333 (1977).
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to subject the law to heightened scrutiny.3 Given this discriminatory
effect, the state had the burden to 'Justify it both in terms of the local
benefits flowing from the statute and the unavailability of
nondiscriminatory alternatives adequate to preserve the local
interests at stake."39 The state was unable to carry this burden.
The third category of cases is similar to the second, and also
involves facially nondiscriminatory state regulations with some negative impact on interstate commerce. In these cases, however, the
courts do not use the term "discriminatory effect" to describe the
differential impact, but speak instead of "incidental" or "indirect"
burdens on interstate commerce--a distinction that suggests an absence of protectionist purpose. In these cases, the state does not bear
the heavy burden of justification invoked in the other two categories.
If there is any "thumb on the scale" of this balancing test, it is a presumption in favor of the government.
40
The leading category-three case is Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.
Pike involved an Arizona statute governing cantaloupe packing. A
state official claimed that enforcement of this law required that the
cantaloupes be packed inside Arizona, which would have required the
company to build an expensive new packing shed. 41 The Court's opinion attempted to synthesize the previous case law:
Although the criteria for determining the validity of state statutes affecting interstate commerce have been variously stated, the general rule that
emerges can be phrased as follows: Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on
interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden
imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local
benefits. If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question becomes one
of degree. And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of course
depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and on whether it could be
promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities. Occasionally the
Court has candidly undertaken a balancing approach in resolving these issues,
but more42frequently it has spoken in terms of "direct" and "indirect" effects and
burdens.

Notwithstanding the application of this gentler balancing test, the
state requirement under consideration in Pike itself did not survive.
38.
39.

Id. at 353.
Id.

40.

397 U.S. 137 (1970).

41. Id. at 140. This requirement arguably should have been classified as explicitly discriminatory (category one), as it distinguished between packing fi-ms on the basis of their

location.
42.

Id. at 142 (citations omitted).
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Since Pike, the Supreme Court and lower courts have applied the
balancing test to a variety of subjects ranging from state corporation
4
laws to highway safety regulations. 3
Although this three-part scheme has the appearance of tidiness, in practice it involves difficult line-drawing. One source of
difficulty is to be found in the second category of cases, consisting of
statutes that are called discriminatory although facially neutral. One
problem is that the term "discrimination" is hardly self-explanatory,
and the courts have not developed a clear test. Moreover, if a
particularly serious form of discrimination (such as a purely protectionist purpose) is present, it would seem reasonable to apply the
more stringent formula applied to facially discriminatory laws (the
first category). Consequently, category two has some tendency to
merge with category one. Indeed, a recent Supreme Court decision
rather casually lumps both categories together as involving "clearly
44
discriminatory" statutes.
Under Pike, category three purportedly applies when a statute
causes merely an "incidental burden" on commerce, whereas category
two involves "discriminatory effects." Several lower courts, however,
45
have interpreted Pike to apply only to "discriminatory" burdens.
With his usual verve, Judge Easterbrook has suggested that Pike
requires the court to look for discrimination, not for "baleful effect,"
rejecting the view that Pike stands for "the broader, all-weather, bereasonable vision of the Constitution. ' 46 Thus, as the Supreme Court

itself has observed, the line between category two and category three
4
has proved permeable. 7

43. See, for example, Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982) (state corporation law);
Raymond Motor Trans., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 440-42 (1978) (regulation of commercial
trucking); Allied Artists Picture Corp. v. Rhodes, 679 F.2d 656 (6th Cir. 1982) (regulation of the
marketing of motion pictures); Procter & Gamble Co. v. City of Chicago, 509 F.2d 69 (1975)
(ordinance forbidding the sale of phosphate detergents). Professor Stewart reads the cases as
establishing a test of "net proportionality." See Richard B. Stewart, International Trade and
Environment: Lessons From the Federal Experience, 49 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1329, 1336 (1992).
44. Fort GratiotSanitaryLandfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dept. of Natural Resources, 112 S. Ct.
2019, 2023-24 (1992).
45. See Norfolk Southern Corp. v. Oberly, 822 F.2d 388, 406 (3d Cir. 1987); J. Filiberto
Sanitation,Inc. v. New Jersey Dept. of Env. Protection,857 F.2d 913, 919-21 (3d Cir. 1988); NationalKerosene HeaterAss'n v. Massachusetts,653 F. Supp. 1079, 1092-93 (D. Mass. 1987).
46. Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. UniversalFoods Corp., 877 F.2d 496, 505 (7th Cir. 1989).
47. "[There is no clear line separating the category of state regulation that is virtually per
se invalid under the Commerce Clause, and the category subject to Pike v. Bruce Church balancing approach." Brown-FormanDistillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Authority, 476 U.S.
573, 577 (1986). Notably, in a recent DCC case, the Court divided 5-4 on whether a municipal
"flow control" ordinance was discriminatory or governed by Pike. C & A Carbone,Inc. v. Town
of Clarkstown, 114 S. Ct. 1677 (1994). In C & A Carbone, Justice O'Connor concurred in the
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Although the task of assigning cases to categories has proved
more difficult than one might expect, the consequences of that assignment are striking. In practice, the strict scrutiny applied to
"discriminatory" statutes usually has proved fatal. Indeed, particularly as to statutes that discriminate on their face against interstate
commerce, the courts have sometimes referred (with some exaggeration) to an almost categorical rule of invalidity.48 To uphold the statute, the state must show that the discrimination is "demonstrably
justified by a valid factor unrelated to economic protectionism." 49
Only a few statutes have survived this test. 50
In contrast to strict scrutiny, the balancing test in practice
seemingly has become rather lax. Indeed, there is some argument
that it requires only that the state present some evidence of a regulatory benefit, particularly when public health or safety is at stake. 51
Courts have been reluctant to "second-guess the empirical judgments
of lawmakers concerning the utility of legislation.' '52 For example, the
Second Circuit applied the balancing test to uphold a New York law
requiring special signs, notices on menus, and special containers for
imitation cheese products. The district judge had found no health

justification for this transparently rent-seeking law.-5

Because of the sharp differences between the results of these
two types of scrutiny, the crucial question in most cases is which type
applies. Unfortunately, the courts have not addressed this question
in a particularly cogent fashion. Often, they simply pronounce that a
statute is or is not "discriminatory." Having attached this label, they
then apply the requisite level of scrutiny. We may rephrase the question, then, by asking what aspects of a state law make a finding of
discrimination more likely.
judgment, finding the ordinance invalid under Pike, while three dissenters applied Pike to uphold the ordinance.
48. See City of Philadelphiav. New Jersey, 437 U.S. at 624; Old Bridge Chemicals, Inc. v.
New Jersey Dept. of Env. Protection, 965 F.2d 1287, 1293 (3d Cir. 1992).
49. FortGratiotSanitary Landfill, 112 S. Ct. at 2023-24 (citing New Energy Co. ofIndiana
v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 274 (1988)).
50. See, for example, Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986), discussed in Part IV.
51. See Electrolert Corp. v. Barry, 737 F.2d 100, 113 (D.C. Cir. 1984); National Kerosene
HeaterAss'n, 653 F. Supp. at 1092. See also J. Filibreto, 857 F.2d at 922; Norfolk Southern, 822
F.2d at 401.
52. Kassel v. ConsolidatedFreightways Corp. 450 U.S. 662, 679 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment), discussed in Part IV.
53. Grocery Manufacturers of America, Inc. v. Gerace, 755 F.2d 993 (2d Cir. 1985). Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981), is a comparable illustration ofjudicial
deference by the Supreme Court. The Court upheld a state law banning the sale of milk in nonreturnable containers made of plastic, but allowing use of other kinds of nonreturnable containers, a distinction that the state supreme court had found completely irrational.
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As we saw earlier, a statute that explicitly distinguishes between products on the basis of their place of manufacture is always
considered "discriminatory." In cases involving facially neutral regulations, courts have treated the following factors as signs of discrimination:
(1) Discriminatoryintent. The real purpose of the statute is to
54
provide an economic advantage to local industries or consumers.
Indeed, Professor Regan has argued that this generally has been the
55
true basis for invalidating state laws.

(2) Use of a proxy characteristic. The statute may regulate on
the basis of some characteristic that, while purportedly neutral, has
little independent significance and is in reality a proxy for geographic
differences--that is, the characteristic is shared by virtually all in6
state firms and virtually no out-of-state firms.5
(3) Embargo. Although the criteria of the statute may not be
transparently irrelevant, the statute nonetheless has the effect of
7
excluding all out-of-state products.5

(4) Competitive advantage. If a statute provides a significant
economic advantage to in-state firms against out-of-state competitors,
it is often, but not always, considered "discriminatory." Note that the
relevant comparison is between competing firms in the same market,
so that this factor is absent when no local competitors exist.8
(5) Uniformity and consistency. In some fields, such as railroad transportation, variations in local regulations may put an intol54. See, for example, Continental Illinois Corp. v. Lewis, 827 F.2d 1517, 1521 (11th Cir.
1987); Middle South Energy, Inc. v. Arkansas Pub Serv. Comm'n, 772 F.2d 404, 416 (8th Cir.
1985). Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission, the leading opinion involving
heightened scrutiny on the basis of discriminatory effects, also contained substantial evidence of
discriminatory purpose. See Hunt, 432 U.S. at 352-353. The same is true in Kassel, as Justice
Brennan's concurrence points out. 450 U.S. at 685-87. The Third Circuit regards discriminatory intent as the sole basis for strict scrutiny. See Oberly, 822 F.2d at 400.
55. Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the
Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 Mich. L. Rev. 1091, 1092 (1986).
56. Compare Atlantic Prince, Ltd. v. Jorling, 710 F. Supp. 893, 902-03 (E.D.N.Y. 1989)
(striking down a New York ban on commercial fishing vessels over 90 feet in length, because
only one such vessel was from New York) with Davrod Corp. v. Coates, 971 F.2d 778, 795-96 (1st
Cir. 1992) (upholding a similar Massachusetts law that applied to many Massachusetts vessels).
A comparable GATT doctrine under the "like product" test is discussed in Part III.B.
57. See Government Suppliers ConsolidatingServices, Inc. v. Bayh, 975 F.2d 1267, 128182 (7th Cir. 1992) (striking down an Indiana statute because it virtually blockaded waste shipments from out of state); Continental Illinois Corp. v. Lewis, 827 F.2d 1517, 1521 (11th Cir.
1987) (invalidating a state law that in effect created an insurmountable barrier to out-of-state
banks seeking to compete for Florida bank deposits). See also Shell Oil Co. v. City of Santa
Monica, 830 F.2d 1052, 1058 (9th Cir. 1987) (upholding statute because it did not restrict flow of
goods or discriminate in favor of local firms).
58. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69, 88 (1987); Government
Suppliers ConsolidatingService, 975 F.2d at 1278-79.
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erable burden on an interstate operation. 59 Differences between state
laws abound and these differences will weigh more heavily on multistate transactions than purely local ones. This is simply an inevitable
cost of a federal system, which to some extent firms simply must expect to live with. Thus, the need for uniformity must be especially
great before courts will intervene.60
Note that the first four of these factors carry decreasing indicia
of discriminatory intent. By the same token, however, these four
factors are usually accompanied by situations in which the state's
regulatory goal lacks credibility and should be given lessened weight
in the balance. The final factor seems to speak more to effect than
intent, but when a state has deviated from an otherwise uniform national pattern of regulation, questions about motivation also naturally
come to mind.
As we see it, the courts are struggling with a dilemma.
Whether the goal is substantive (optimizing regulation of interstate
transactions) or process-based (compensating for political biases
against out-of-state interests), the most logical approach would be
balancing. A cost-benefit analysis would insure that the rules were
optimal, and also that regulators had taken regulatory burdens on
outsiders into account. At least some language in Pike seems to lean
in this direction. But open-ended balancing is widely perceived to
give far too much power to federal judges at the expense of legislatures. Drawing back from the Lochnerian implications of balancing,
courts are tempted to limit themselves to policing for discriminatory
intent. But intent is often difficult to prove, so the temptation is to
substitute an objective proxy. For instance, if the court is confident
that a statute will produce no regulatory benefits, it may reasonably
conclude that the motive must have been protectionist. Yet a "no
benefits" test would be too weak, because a statute may produce
minor benefits but be overwhelmingly protectionist. The impulse
then is to strengthen the test, leading back toward balancing.6 1 None
of these solutions seems wholly satisfactory. The resulting difficulties

59. Alternatively, a state regulation may be internally inconsistent in the sense that, if
identical regulations were adopted by all states, interstate firms would be at an obvious disadvantage compared with local ones. This internal inconsistency test usually applies to state tax
laws, but sometimes has been applied to state regulations as well. See Brown-Forman Corp. v.
Tennessee Alcoholic Bev. Comm'n, 860 F.2d 1354, 1361 (6th Cir. 1988).
60. See Old Bridge Chemicals v. New Jersey Dept. of EnvironmentalProtection, 965 F.2d
1287, 1292 (1992).
61. Or, despairing of any better resolution, the courts might leave the field entirely; this
retreat is blocked not only by precedent but by the clear desirability of some safeguard against
protectionist state legislation.
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As we will see, similar problems have troubled tribunals and
negotiators in the context of international trade. This suggests to us
that the problems are fundamental rather than being artifacts of the
U.S. legal system, that there are no clear-cut solutions, and that the
best that can be done is a rough-and-ready compromise of the competing goals of free trade and local regulatory autonomy.
B. The GATT Analogue to DCC
1. The Legal Structure
Unlike the constraints imposed on state government action
under the dormant Commerce Clause, the similar GATT constraints
imposed on member governments rest on an explicit mandate. GATT
is a formal international agreement containing specific prohibitions of
certain kinds of protectionist trade barriers. The basic structure of
the GATT agreement begins with "tariff bindings" setting a maximum
rate for tariffs on an item-by-item basis. 2 Then, to protect against
other measures that would subvert the commercial opportunity
created by tariff bindings, the GATT agreement adds a rather
63
detailed code of rules prohibiting most other forms of trade barriers.
62. Tariff bindings are established by periodic negotiation, and then recorded in individual
country schedules that are given binding effect by GATT Article II.
63. The main provisions are the prohibition of non-tariff border restrictions under GATT
Article XI:I and the prohibition of discriminatory internal taxes and regulations under the socalled national treatment rule of GATT Article III. The text of Article XI:I, which is subject to
numerous exceptions, provides quite simply and broadly:
1. No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges,
whether made effective through quotas, import or export licenses or other measures,
shall be instituted or maintained by any contracting party on the importation of any
product of the territory of any other contracting party or on the exportation or sale for
export of any product destined for the territory of any other contracting party.
The two key provisions of the national treatment rule of GATT Article III read as follows:
2. The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any other contracting party shall not be subject, directly or indirectly, to internal
taxes or other internal charges of any kind in excess of those applied, directly or indirectly, to like domestic products. Moreover, no contracting party shall otherwise apply
internal taxes or other internal charges to imported or domestic products in a manner
contrary to the principles set forth in paragraph 1 [that is, internal measures should not
"afford protection to domestic production!].
4. The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than
that accorded to like products of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and
requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation,
distribution or use....
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The application of GATT rules ultimately raises the same type
of issues confronted by U.S. courts under DCC doctrine. GATT's
prohibitory rules are qualified by GATT Article XX, which authorizes
exceptions whenever trade barriers are found to be required by other
widely-accepted government regulatory objectives such as health,
safety, or law-enforcement.6 Application of Article XX requires GATT
tribunals to analyze the extent to which claimed regulatory objectives
are served by a particular trade-restricting measure. A similar analysis of regulatory objectives is built into certain supplemental GATT
rules that deal with facially neutral measures, such as the 1994 Standards Code prohibition of measures that create "unnecessary obsta65
cles to international trade.
It is instructive to compare the GATT legal doctrines in this
area with the DCC doctrines just discussed. As with the DCC, GATT
cases can be categorized usefully as facially discriminatory or facially
neutral.
2. Cases Involving Explicit Discrimination
As in DCC doctrine, GATT law imposes the greatest restraints
on trade-restricting measures that explicitly discriminate between
domestic and foreign goods. Under GATT, the main items in this
category would be border measures such as quotas and other restric64.

The Article reads as follows:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries
where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade,
nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by
any contracting party of measures:
(a) necessary to protect public morals;
(b)
necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health;
(c)
relating to the importation or exportation of gold or silver;
(d) necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement, including those relating to customs enforcement, the enforcement of monopolies operated under paragraph 4 of Article II and
Article XVII, the protection of patents, trade marks and copyrights, and the prevention
of deceptive practices.
(e) relating to the products of prison labour;
(f)
imposed for the protection of national treasures of artistic, historic or archaeological value;
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption;
(h) [commodity agreements]
(i)
[price-controlled products]
(j)
[short supply situations).
GATT Article XK.
65. 1994 GATT StandardsCode, Art. 2.2 (cited in note 5).
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tions that limit the volume of foreign goods allowed to enter the national market, and "internal" taxes or regulations that provide more
onerous treatment of foreign goods. The DCC case law suggests that
such explicitly discriminatory measures are all but per se prohibited
under the Commerce Clause, though in practice, courts recognize
some exceptions. 66 Under GATT, such discriminatory measures are
prima facie outlawed by the rules of the agreement, 67 but GATT
Article XX clearly states that even explicitly discriminatory measures
can be authorized when such discrimination is shown to be necessary
to legitimate regulatory objectives.
GATT's Section 337 case offers a good example of GATT's approach to this first category of cases. 68 Section 337, a United States

patent-enforcement law, established a special procedure applicable
only to infringement claims against imported goods, which, in many
respects, was more burdensome than the procedure applicable to
claims against domestic goods. The explicitly "less favourable" treatment of foreign goods constituted a prima facie violation of GATT
Article III:4.69 The United States sought to establish an Article XX
defense, claiming that different procedures were required for infringement claims against imports because of the special difficulties of
enforcing patent rights against foreign parties. The GATT rejected
most of the Article XX defense, finding that the United States had
failed to demonstrate that effective enforcement could not be achieved
by nondiscriminatory alternatives. 70 But GATT did rule that one part
of the special enforcement procedure was justified, holding that the
difficulty of enforcing injunctions against foreign producers justified
71
the use of certain in rem remedies against foreign infringers only.
The main difference between the treatment of explicitly discriminatory measures under GATT, as compared to DCC doctrine, is
the GATT's tendency to give somewhat greater attention to possible
justifications for such measures. The explicit terms of GATT Article
XX encourage defendant governments to raise justification claims,
and require GATT legal decisions to address the issue of justification
explicitly. As a result, the legal analysis of claims of justification
tends to be more fully elaborated in GATT. A string of GATT deci-

66.
67.
68.
69.

See note 50.
See note 63.
United States: Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, BISD, 36th Supp. 345 (1990).
Id. at %5.20.

70.

Id. at 77 5.28 to 5.35. A GATT three-person arbitration panel wrote this decision,

which was then adopted by GATT as a whole.
71. Id. at 77 5.32,5.33.
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sions have laid down a demanding framework of analysis in which the
burden is on the enacting government to demonstrate each element of
the claimed excuse.72
The carefully stated exceptions found in GATT Article XX
represent an acknowledgment by the GATT's drafters that certain
national regulatory goals have a high enough priority to override
GATT's free trade goals in cases of true conflict. The relative infrequency of such recognition in DCC doctrine raises a question of
whether different priorities are at work within the U.S. federal system. It is possible that a real substantive difference exists. Perhaps
the national governments who are the subjects of GATT law are in a
relatively more powerful position than the U.S. state governments
subject to DCC doctrine, and so are able to exert stronger claims on
behalf of their "other" regulatory goals. On the other hand, there is
also good reason to think that the difference simply may be a consequence of differing legal structures. Consider: If Congress were to
reduce DCC doctrine to a statute as detailed as GATT, would there
not be an Article XX explicitly recognizing state regulatory claims in
all cases (including facially discriminatory statutes)? And would the
statute not be about as generous to these goals as is Article XX? We
are inclined to think so. We think the body of DCC case law
suggesting the per se invalidity of explicitly discriminatory measures
understates considerably the potential relevance of state regulatory
goals, an understatement probably due to the worm's eye view of the
issues presented by case-by-case analysis of relatively easy cases.
3. Cases Involving Facially Neutral Classifications
As is true of DCC doctrine, the GATT law also deals with facially neutral measures that disadvantage foreign firms compared
with domestic ones. The GATT doctrine dealing with facially neutral

72. Important GATT panel decisions construing Article XX include, in chronological order:
United States: Prohibitionof Imports of Tuna and Tuna Productsfrom Canada, BISD, 29th
Supp. 91 (1983); Canada-Administration of the Foreign Investment Review Act (FIRA), BISD,
30th Supp. 140 (1984); Canada. Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring and
Salmon, BISD, 35th Supp. 98 (1989); United States: Section 337 of the TariffAct of 1930, BISD,
36th Supp. 345 (1990); European Economic Community: Regulation on Imports of Parts and
Components, BISD, 37th Supp. 132 (1991); Thailand:Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes,BISD, 37th Supp. 200 (1991); United States: Restrictionson Imports of
Tuna, BISD, 39th Supp. 155 (1993) (the celebrated 'runa-Dolphin Decision"); United States:
MeasuresAffecting Alcoholic andMalt Beverages, BISD, 39th Supp. 206 (1993). On the general
importance of such burden-of-proof standards to GATT! decision making in general, see Robert
E. Hudec, EnforcingInternationalTrade Law: The Evolution of the Modern GATT Legal System
267-68 (Butterworth, 1993).
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measures does not divide into the two rather permeable subcategories
found in DCC doctrine, at least not at a visible level. But GATT doctrine has developed some rather illuminating refinements of its own.
Two types of facially neutral measures tend to appear in GATT
legal disputes. One common type is the measure that provides different taxes or regulatory treatment for two groups of similar products
in a way that places all or most foreign products in the disadvantaged
category. An example might be emission controls that impose lower
taxes or less burdensome requirements for large-bore engines used in
domestic automobiles than for small-bore engines normally used in
foreign autos.73 A second type of facially neutral measure that causes
trade problems is the uniform product standard that, although exactly
the same for everyone, is substantially more difficult for foreign producers to comply with because of their different geographical or market positions. For example, a product standard requiring a new production process may pose relatively few problems for domestic firms
who sell most of their output in the home market, but may be much
more burdensome to foreign producers who must set up a separate
74
production line for a single export market.
Both types of facially neutral measures are regulated by GATT
Article III in the first instance. Almost by definition, facially neutral
regulations fall in the category of so-called "internal" measures--taxes
or other regulatory measures that are imposed on imported goods
(together with domestic goods) after the imported goods have cleared
customs and entered domestic commerce. GATT Article III requires
that internal taxes and internal regulations treat foreign goods no
less favorably than the "like" domestic goods. This is the so-called
"national treatment" rule. Any measure found in violation of Article
III would be a prima facie violation, and thus in the same category of
explicitly discriminatory measures. Any regulatory justification for
such a measure would have to comply with the strict rules of GATT
Article XX.
73. Another example, more European in flavor, might be an alcoholic beverage tax distinguishing between fruit-based distilled alcohol and grain-based distilled alcohol, in a country
where most domestic production of alcoholic beverages falls into the former category while most
imports fall into the latter.
74. One example, which may or may not have been legal under GAIT, was a European
Community prohibition against the sale of beef grown with the use of certain hormones. EC
producers could adapt by converting all production to more expensive hormone-free production,
and could recoup the extra costs under the higher prices they would obtain in the European
market due to the regulation's exclusion of beef produced more cheaply with hormones.
Exporters who sold only low-value offal (the animal's organs) to EC markets had to set up
separate production lines for EC markets, and had no way of recouping extra production costs
for the rest of the animal. For commentary on the case, see articles cited in note 23.
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The GATT also contains two sets of special supplemental rules
that apply to the second type of facially neutral measure-product
standards. One is the 1994 GATT Standards Code, 75 and the other is
a new 1994 Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS
Agreement).76 Both agreements take a different approach than the
basic doctrine laid down by Articles III and XX. To present an orderly
description of GATT law on facially neutral measures, we must start
with Article III and then turn to these two supplemental rules. We
begin by describing the Article III law applicable to the first type of
measure.
a. SpuriousProductDistinctions
The emerging Article III doctrine on measures that make regulatory distinctions according to product characteristics has some
parallels to DCC cases involving proxy characteristics. 77 A recent
GATT decision interprets Article III to permit GATT to regulate such
measures according to the credibility of their claimed regulatory
purpose. The case involved a Mississippi tax on wines that placed a
lower rate on wines made from the vitus rotundifolia grape used by
most Mississippi vintners; wines made from all other types of grape
were taxed at a higher rate.7 8 Under Article III, equal treatment is
required for all "like" products. The issue was whether wine from the
rotundifolia grape was a "like product" to wine made from other
grapes. The GATT tribunal concluded that the "likeness" issue must
always turn on the purpose for which the product distinction is being
tested. Holding that the purpose of the Article III "like product"
standard is to distinguish between protectionism and good faith regulation, the decision concluded that the "likeness" of the two products
must depend on whether any non-trade regulatory purpose was
served by distinguishing between the two types of wine. 79
75.
76.
77.
78.

See note 5.
See note 24.
See text accompanying note 56.
United States: Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages, BISD, 39th Supp.

206 (1993) (analyzing numerous claims of violations against U.S. federal and state laws affecting alcoholic beverages including beer). The vitus rotundifolia grape is a variety suitable for

warmer climates, including the Mediterranean basin.
79.

Id. at 1 5.25. The foundations for this ruling were laid by a relatively unnoticed GATT

legal ruling in 1987 involving an Article III complaint against Japanese taxes on (of all things)
alcoholic beverages. Japan: Customs Duties, Taxes and LabelingPractices on Imported Wines
and Alcoholic Beverages, BISD, 34th Supp. 83 (1988). In a long and complex opinion, the panel,

inter alia, established the separateness of the Article III "like product" test, see id. at 5.6,
rejected discrimination based on an arbitrary product characteristic, see id. at 5.9(d), and held
that the tax treatment of certain dissimilar but directly competitive or substitutable products
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The actual decision on this point was aided by a United States
concession that the distinction served no regulatory purpose. 0 The
various types of wine in question were thus all like products. Under
Article III, therefore, all the imported wine products were entitled to
be treated as well as any domestic product in that category. The
heavier tax against the non-Mississippi types of wine was thus a violation of Article 111.81

The next step in the Mississippi wine decision normally would
have been an inquiry into Article XX justifications, where the burden
would have been on the enacting government to demonstrate a regulatory policy justification. However, the regulatory justification for
the product distinction had already been considered and rejected
when deciding the "like product" issue as a part of the question of
violation under Article III. Indeed, the test stated by the GATT decision would require simultaneous consideration of regulatory justification with the decision on the Article III violation itself.
The Mississippi wine decision never reached the question of
who bore the burden of proving whether the product distinction
served any regulatory purpose. There being no finding of prima facie
violation at this stage of the Article III analysis, the Article XX rationale for placing the burden of justification on the defendant did not
apply. At this early stage, the only fact before the decision maker was
the bare fact that the tax measure in question was trade-restricting,
that is, it resulted in a commercial disadvantage for almost all nonMississippi wine, foreign or domestic. Should that trade-restricting
effect be enough, by itself, to render the measure suspect, with the
burden on the defendant to justify it? Or, should a tribunal still apply
the baseline rule for all legal complaints that the burden is on the
complainant to establish at least a prima facie violation?
Intuition suggests that, in practice, a decision-making tribunal
probably will be influenced in its approach by an initial common sense
characterization of the measure. There will be some cases, like the
Mississippi wine tax, in which the degree of trade-restricting effect
seems clear and the criteria seem bogus. These initial appearances
will result in a strong initial presumption of protectionist purpose.
On the other hand, there will be some cases in which the smell of
ulterior motive just will not be there-cases, perhaps, when disadvanconstituted a protection of domestic production in contravention of the second sentence of
Article 111:2, see id. at
5.7 and 5.11.
80. United States: Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages, BISD, 39th Supp.
206 at 5.26.
81. Id.
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tages are not distributed so unevenly to foreign goods, or when the
measure's criteria may have a plausible regulatory ring to them.
Decision-making tribunals probably will follow these initial presumptions in deciding how much or how little to ask of the enacting government by way of justification. If this is a correct appreciation of the
actual decision-making process in these cases, it may explain why
U.S. courts in DCC cases tend to begin their analysis with an unexplained characterization of the measure either as "discriminatory" or
only "incidentally" burdensome.
GATT decision makers probably will not have the luxury of
disguising their approach so easily. National governments will expect
more candor, at least on the surface. And, because national governments will insist on maximum deference to state regulatory claims,
GATT law probably will leave the burden on the complainant of proving a violation until at least a prima facie violation of GATT is shown.
This formal rule will not change the result in cases involving clear-cut
protectionist measures like the Mississippi wine tax, but it should
result in greater leeway for governments when protectionist purpose
is not as evident.
The GATT legal proceeding that dealt with the Mississippi
wine case also contained another claim requiring application of the
"like product" test. This claim involved marketing regulations by
several U.S. state governments that distinguished between sales of
82
3.2 percent beer and sales of beer with higher alcohol content. Most

of the beer imports from the complaining country had an alcohol
content above 3.2 percent. 83 "Beer is beer," said the claimant, arguing
that all kinds of beer should be treated as "like products," and so had
to be treated the same. 84 Not so, said the GATT decision. The panel
concluded that the history of the distinction in alcohol content showed
a bona fide concern for health, and revenue maximization, and not for
any trade purpose; consequently, the two types of beer should not be
classified as like products.8 5

One suspects that U.S. courts would

have reached the same result, calling the trade-restricting effects of
these beer marketing regulations an "incidental burden on
commerce." It was not a hard case under either approach.

82.
83.
84.
85.

Id. at 2.32, Table 4.
Id. at
3.127, 3.129.
Id. at %3.120.
Id. at
5.74, 5.75.
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b. Differential Compliance Costs
We turn now to the second type of facially neutral measures
that can have trade restricting effects-regulations or product standards which, though imposing exactly the same requirements for all
products, bear more heavily on foreign producers than on domestic
producers. The example given earlier was a regulation that requires
setting up a new production process.
The key legal provision of the original GATT agreement applicable to such measures is Article III:4, which requires that internal
regulations accord imports "treatment no less favourable" than domestic goods. 86 When the treatment of imports is both explicitly different and more burdensome, the Article III:4 violation would be
clear; issues of excuse would be dealt with under Article XX with the
burden of justification on the enacting government. When the more
burdensome treatment is the result of a facially neutral regulation,
however, the meaning of Article III:4 has not yet been made clear.
This interpretative difficulty requires an extended explanation.
If we look to United States DCC law on this type of facially
neutral measure, we find that the validity of such measures seems to
turn, in one way or another, on the balance between the measure's
trade-restricting effects and the regulatory purpose the measure
claims to serve. When the trade-restricting effects are substantial
while the regulatory benefits are nil or minuscule, we expect to find
courts ruling against the measure, either on the ground that its regulatory benefits are outweighed by its burden on commerce, or that its
lack of credible regulatory purpose is evidence of a protectionist purpose.8 7 In dealing with such balancing-type issues, the U.S. courts
tend to issue a priori characterizations of the measure as
"discriminatory" or merely "incidentally" burdensome. As in the cases
discussed earlier, one suspects that a priori characterizations are the
means by which courts adjust their degree of scrutiny according to
their initial common sense perceptions of the likely purpose of the
measure.
This preliminary sorting operation seems quite useful in view
of the great diversity of regulatory measures that fall into this category. At one extreme are the devious product standards aimed solely
at disadvantaging foreign goods; at the other are a very large number
of quite ordinary regulatory measures that happen to impose some
86.
87.

See note 63 for the text of Art. 111:4.
See text accompanying note 61.
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greater degree of burden on foreign producers. If the mere existence
of greater burdens on foreign producers were to call for strict scrutiny
of the measure, governments would be required to mount a major
defense for almost every regulatory action they take.
Article III:4 does not seem to offer much flexibility, however, in
dealing with this wide variety of facially neutral measures. Article
III:4 separates the question of legal violation from the issue of regulatory justification. The issue of violation is framed solely as a matter
of whether the treatment of fol eign goods is "less favourable"--in
other words, commercially disadvantageous. If the commercial disadvantage is not ruled to be "less favourable treatment," no violation
exists, and the case is over. If the commercial disadvantage is ruled
to be "less favourable treatment," then the measure is a prima facie
GATT violation, and the regulatory justification, if any, will be considered only under Article XX, with the burden on the enacting government to prove every element of the exception. The only way that
Article III:4 expressly permits consideration of regulatory purpose is
after the measure has already been ruled a violation. And because
the finding of violation involves only the issue of commercial burden
under an apparently monolithic "less favourable treatment" standard,
GATT may find it difficult to control disguised protectionist measures
at one end of the spectrum without having to find all other regulation
with adverse trade effects to be in violation (and thus subject to the
strict tests of Article XX).
The "less favourable treatment" standard in Article III-4 has
been interpreted to cover facially neutral measures in two earlier
decisions, neither very authoritative. The GATT's Section 337 decision contained a single sentence of dictum that a facially neutral
measure may constitute less favorable treatment of imported goods if
it creates a commercial disadvantage for imports.88 The second was a
decision of a panel constituted under the Canada-U.S. Free Trade
Agreement, which applied GATT obligations incorporated in that
Agreement.89 The case involved a facially neutral landing-cum-inspection requirement (an internal regulation) that imposed a substantial burden on subsequent export sales of fish as compared with domestic sales. Applying the GATT Article XI:1 analogue to Article

88. United States: Section 337 of the TariffAct of 1930, BISD, 36th Supp. 345 at 5.11.
See notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
89. In re Canada's Landing Requirements for Salmon and Herring, 12 Int'l Trade Reporter Decisions (BNA) 1026 (1991).

1428

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:1401

III:4, which covers internal measures affecting export transactions, 90
the panel held that, even though the inspection requirement was
facially neutral, the greater commercial burden on the export sales
made it a "restriction" (i.e., "less favourable treatment") falling within
the GAT prohibition.9 1 The panel then considered and rejected the
regulatory justification for the measure under Article XX. 92 Neither of
these decisions addresses, much less solves, the question of how to
confine this analysis so that it will not sweep up all government regulations that involve any differential commercial burden for foreign
goods.
In the long run, the trick to making Article III:4 a sufficiently
flexible and sensitive legal standard lies in finding some way to interpret the "less favourable treatment" standard in a way that will permit tribunals to limit its application to more egregious measures that
involve little or no genuine regulatory purpose. This has been done
with the "like product" test of Article III, but it is more difficult to
achieve with a test that speaks only in terms of commercial disadvantage.
A possible answer may lie, however, in the National Treatment
provision of the new Uruguay Round Services Agreement. 93 The new
provision restates the national treatment concept in more detail than
GATT Article III. It begins by employing the old "less favourable
treatment" standard. It then resolves the important question of
whether facially neutral measures are covered, saying yes, that the
prohibition applies both to "formally identical and formally different"
measures whenever they "modify conditions of competition" in favor of
domestic suppliers. 94 But the new text then goes on to add that the

90. Article III does not apply to export transactions. Article XI:I contains an analogous
requirement prohibiting restrictions on "exportation or sale for export of any product" Id. at
6.04 (emphasis in original). The panel explained that it was treating the reference to "sale for
export" as an analogue to Article III:4. Id. at
6.04 to 6.06.
91. Id. at
6.08, 6.09, 6.12, and 6.13. The panel's ruling was expressed somewhat
narrowly; instead of the broad proposition that any significant commercial disadvantage would
constitute a "restriction" within the meaning of Article XI:1, the panel appeared to rest its
conclusion on the fact that the primary effect of the landing requirement was to alter the way
exports were made:
The Panel concluded that where the primary effect of a measure is in fact the
regulation of export transactions, the measure may be considered a restriction within
the meaning of Article XI:1 if it has the effect of imposing a materially greater commercial burden on exports than on domestic sales.
Id. at 6.09.
92. Id. at 7.38.
93. General Agreement on Trade in Services ("GATS"), Art. XVII, in 1994 GATT Final
Act, II-A1B. See note 2.
94. GATS at Art. XVII:3.
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prohibition does not apply to "inherent competitive disadvantages
which result from the foreign character of the relevant services or
service suppliers. ' 5 When will a competitive disadvantage be considered "inherent [to] ... the foreign character" of the foreign supplier?
The answer, presumably, is when the regulation producing the disadvantage is assigned no "causal" weight in that outcome. And when
will that be? When, we submit, the regulation has the kind of routine
normalcy (dare we say, credibility?) that makes it look like innocently
ordinary domestic regulation with no protectionist purpose. The word
"inherent" is synonymous with "inevitable" here, the idea being to
describe a situation in which there is no way that a regulation, even if
enacted with the best of good faith and pure motives, can avoid disadvantaging the foreign supplier. In short, by introducing the all-purpose concept of causation, the drafters of the Uruguay Round Services
Agreement may, in fact, have succeeded in introducing the issue of
valid regulatory purpose into the legal definition of "less favourable
treatment."
This national treatment provision of the new Services Agreement can be viewed as an updated restatement of the national treatment concept, adopted by all GATT governments. The exclusion of
"inherent competitive disadvantages" from the category of actionable
violations thus also could be incorporated into Article III:4 itself, as a
gloss on the meaning of its own "less favourable treatment" language.
In either context, incidentally, the concept of "inherent competitive
disadvantages" likely would function as a less-than-fully-explained
category, not unlike the concept of "incidental burden" in United
States DCC cases.
Leaving the puzzle of Article III:4, we turn to two sets of supplemental GATT rules that also deal with the issue of facially neutral
product standards that impose commercial disadvantages on foreign
producers. One is the new Uruguay Round Version of the GATT
Standards Code, initially promulgated in 1979, that applies to any
and all product standards. 96 The other is the new Uruguay Round
Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Restrictions ("SPS Agreement"), that pertains to product standards relating to human, animal,
and plant health and safety.97 The Standards Code will be treated as

95. Id. at Art. XVI:1 n.ll.
96. The current 1994 version of the Standards Code covers standards defined in terms of
the characteristics of the product, as well as standards defined in terms of production processes
insofar as they affect the quality of the products themselves. 1994 GATT Standards Code, Arts.
2.2, 2.8 (cited in note 5).
97. See note 24.
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lex specialis superseding Article III:4 to the extent it overlaps, and the
SPS Agreement, being even more specific, will be treated as superseding both Article III:4 and the Standards Code to the extent it overlaps.
Both the Standards Code and the SPS Agreement escape the
dilemma created by the bifurcated approach of Articles III:4 and XX.
Both contain rules that permit tribunals to weigh a measure's traderestricting effects and its regulatory justification at the same time.
Article 2.2 of the Standards Code provides as follows:
Members shall ensure that technical regulations are not prepared, adopted or
applied with a view to or with the effect of creating unnecessary obstacles to
international trade. For this purpose, technical regulations shall not be more
trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfill a legitimate objective, taking account
of the risks non-fulfillment would create. Such legitimate objectives are, inter
alia, national security requirements; the prevention of deceptive practices; protection of human health or safety, animal or plant life or health, or the environment. In assessing such risks, relevant elements of consideration are, inter
alia, available scientific and technical information, related processing technology or intended end use of products.9 8

The text clearly calls for an analysis and evaluation of the regulatory
purpose of the measure.
The SPS Agreement contains a rather lengthy and convoluted
set of legal standards, but the basic provisions are similar to those of
the Standards Code. Paragraphs 6 and 7 of the Agreement provide:
6.
Members shall ensure that any sanitary or phytosanitary measure is applied only to the extent necessary to protect human, animal or plant
life or health, is based on scientific principles and is not maintained without
sufficient scientific evidence, except [as later provided].
7.
... Sanitary and phytosanitary measures shall not be applied in
a manner which would constitute a disguised restriction on international
trade. 99

The concept of "disguised restriction" has been interpreted to refer to
cases where a claimed regulatory purpose is found to be of so little
importance, or is so little served, that it can be called a disguise. 10 0
98.
99.

1994 StandardsCode, Art. 2.2 (cited in note 5).
1994 GATT SPS Agreement,
6 and 7 (cited in note 24).

100. This interpretation was adopted by a dispute settlement panel convened under the
U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement. In re Canada'sLanding Requirements, 12 Int'l Trade Re-

porter Decisions 1026 at 1 7.11 and n.20. To be sure, this interpretation is at odds with the
view taken in two GATT panel decisions that "disguised" means not publicly announced; see
United States: Imports of Certain Automotive Spring Assemblies, BISD, 30th Supp. 107, 56
(1984); United States: Prohibitionof Imports of Tuna and Tuna Productsfrom Canada,BISD,
29th Supp. 91, 4.8 (1983). The latter interpretation makes no sense. It seems clear that the

governments who agreed to the recent incorporation of the "disguised restriction" formula into
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Both of these special agreements call for a balancing analysis
similar to what one finds in the opinions of U.S. courts in DCC cases.
Some of the points made earlier in this section can be repeated with
regard to the likely application of this balancing analysis. First, although GATT tribunals will no doubt be inclined to analyze. measures
strictly or otherwise according to initial common sense appraisals of
their regulatory purpose, they are unlikely to follow the practice of
U.S. courts of making ab initio distinctions between "discriminatory"
and "incidental" burdens. Rather, as a formal matter they will probably follow the general starting point rule that complainants bear the
burden of proving a violation, at least until a prima facie violation is
demonstrated. As a consequence, the actual degree of deference to
legislative policy is likely to be somewhat greater than in DCC cases,
but also is likely to remain somewhat more hidden.
IV. THE UNDERLYING STANDARD: COST-BENEFIT, MOTIVE, OR WHAT?

Having explored the structural similarities and differences
between DCC law and its GATT counterparts, we now turn to the key
question of the substantive standards. The fact problem we have
been discussing involves two main elements: (1) a trade-restricting
measure (whether explicitly discriminatory or facially neutral); and
(2) some kind of justification for the measure in terms of recognized,
non-trade regulatory purpose. The central substantive issue is the
way that these two elements are to be evaluated and balanced by the
decision maker.
We have identified two related types of substantive standards
that can be applied to the situation described by these two elements.
On the one hand, a tribunal can do a cost-benefit analysis, asking
whether the trade-restricting effect of the measure is justified by the
regulatory benefit it achieves. On the other hand, a tribunal can examine the question of whether the measure has a protectionist purpose or motive. As we have noted earlier, the same evidence of minimal regulatory achievement tends to support a guilty verdict under
either standard.

several new Uruguay Round agreements, see note 118, were doing so in agreement with the
former meaning.
Paragraph 11 of the 1994 GATT SPS Agreement provides for acceptance of measures that
conform to internationally accepted standards, but provides that higher standards must bejustified by scientific evidence.
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In GATT, as in DCC cases, the primary objections to the activities of legal tribunals in this area involve challenges to: (1) their capacity to make accurate judgments about the effects of regulatory
measures; and (2) the political legitimacy of their making such judgments in the first place. The main difficulty is found when tribunals
try to make judgments about the regulatory benefits of such measures.
Judgments about the harms caused by such measures--the
existence and degree of competitive disadvantage-have not proved
too troublesome. In GATT law, the issue of commercial disadvantage
is not whether some specific commercial loss can be proved (usually
impossible due to the number of separate factors influencing any
business outcome). Rather, the issue is whether the measure has
changed "the conditions of competition," in the words of the Services
Agreement.11 Assessment of competitive impact is essentially a matter of rather simple business economics, applied to undisputed facts.
GATT decisions have not encountered much criticism on this score.
So far as we are aware, the identification of burdens on interstate
commerce also has been relatively non-controversial in DCC cases.
In GATT, as in DCC doctrine, tribunals encounter much
stronger objections to decisions about the regulatory benefits of the
measures in question. GATT tribunals have few credentials to assess
the success or social value of regulatory measures and lack any recognized political mandate to do so. The competence of federal courts in
this area is also suspect, though perhaps to a lesser extent given the
extensive fact-finding procedures available in modern litigation. The
difficulty varies, however, according to the particular facts and issues
presented.
GATT tribunals have received a fair degree of acceptance for
one particular type of decision holding that a regulatory measure
produces no benefit at all. These decisions conclude that the same
regulatory benefit can be achieved by an alternative measure that is
less trade-restricting or not trade-restricting at all. In the Section 337
case, for example, the panel was able to secure acceptance of its
judgment that the special expedited procedure required by the United
States for foreign patent violations did no more to protect patent
owners against irremediable injury than could be accomplished by
various kinds of other trade-neutral preliminary protective remedies. 0 2 Likewise, in the much discussed Thai Cigarette case, the
101. GATS, Art. XVIi, 33 (cited in note 93).
102. See notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
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panel found that a ban on imports of U.S. cigarettes alone contributed
no more to anti-smoking policies than could have been accomplished
by trade-neutral restrictions on all cigarette sales.10S Although comparison of alternatives is often constrained by the difficulty of the
technical or scientific judgments involved,10 4 these cases show this
type of comparison can be a very powerful regulatory tool. Particularly in cases involving discriminatory measures, U.S. courts also
have found it easy to point out equally effective but nondiscriminatory alternatives.10 5
In a fair number of other cases, the facts are simply clear
enough to allow a credible finding of no regulatory benefit. In the
first Salmon and Herring decision, tried before a regular GATT panel,
the panel rejected Canada's assertion that an export restriction had a
conservation purpose on the ground that Canada imposed no limits on
export or consumption once the fish had been processed. 1°6 Likewise
in an earlier case, a GATT panel rejected a claim that an import ban
on tuna was in aid of conservation measures by noting that the
United States had no conservation limits on its own fishermen.107 In
the DCC context, a similar example is provided in Hunt, where a
specious consumer protection rationale was offered for a blatantly
protectionist labeling rule.108 These claims of regulatory purpose are
quite transparently bogus, having been dreamed up in the lawyers'
offices only after the measure is challenged. A fairly large number of
justifications fall into this category.10 9
103. See Thailand: Restrictionson Importationof and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes,BISD,
37th Supp. 200, 81 (1991). For another decision employing the same type of analysis, see Japan: Customs Duties, Taxes and LabelingPracticeson Imported Wines and Alcoholic Beverages,
BISD, 34th Supp. 83, 5.13 (1988) (ruling that achievement of a social policy of taxing alcoholic
beverages according to ability to pay did not require using GATT-illegal discriminatory taxes).
104. See, for example, the criticism of the second Salmon and Herringdecision, notes 11516 and accompanying text.
105. Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951) is the leading case. See also
Hunt, 432 U.S. at 354 (discussing nondiscriminatory alternatives to state labeling requirement).
106. Canada: Measures Affecting Exports of UnprocessedHerringand Salmon, BISD, 35th
Supp. 98, 4.7 (1989). Local processing requirements have been similarly disfavored under the
DCC. See Carbone, 114 S. Ct. at 1682-83 (citing cases).
107. United States: ProhibitionofImports of Tuna and Tuna Productsfrom Canada,BISD
29th Supp. 91, 17 4.10-4.13 (1983).
108. See Hunt, 432 U.S. at 352-53.
109. Although such bogus claims of justification may seem unworthy of responsible governmental behavior, it must be remembered that the officials representing a government owe a
responsibility to defend its actions. The way in which such defenses are actually made and
handled deserves careful examination.
In most cases, government lawyers will maintain such defenses for only a decent length of
time, and will not protest too strongly when they lose. Government attorneys are usually sensitive to the fact that they represent the government as a whole, and not the special interest
group that managed to obtain the protectionist measure. This is certainly true in GATT litiga-
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It will be substantially more difficult for tribunals to find that
apparently neutral health, safety, or environmental regulations produce no regulatory benefit at all. Although the new GATT SPS
Agreement does contain a requirement that such measures must have
a scientific basis,"0 the Agreement permits risk-avoiding measures
when the scientific evidence is unclear,," and it is already clear that
governments will insist on having a fair degree of leeway in defining
and weighing risks of the unknown.
The Supreme Court apparently has given similar leeway to
states, even for discriminatory measures. In Maine v. Taylor,n 2 the
Court upheld a Maine statute banning the importation of bait fish.
The Court gave great deference to the testimony of three experts who
claimed that Maine's fisheries might be placed at risk because of
parasites present only in out-of-state bait fish. Despite a contrary
opinion from another expert, the Court concluded that Maine was
justified in regulating even without definite scientific proof:
Maine has a legitimate interest in guarding against imperfectly understood environmental risks, despite the possibility that they may ultimately
prove to be negligible.... [It need not] sit idly by and wait until potentially irreversible environmental damage has occurred or until the scientific community agrees on what disease organisms are or are not dangerous before it acts
to avoid such consequences .1

Under the Court's current formulation, the state must overcome a formidable burden of proof, given the strong presumption
against facially discriminatory statutes. We are not sure the Taylor
Court's scrutiny was quite this rigorous in reality. The evidence on
behalf of the state shows the statute had a possible justification, but
not that it, in fact, was necessary. On the other hand, the evidence
apparently was strong enough to satisfy reasonable legislators, who
certainly could have believed a ban on out-of-state bait fish produced
significant benefits compared to alternatives with lesser trade effects.
Perhaps in recognition of the difficulty of this kind of environmental risk assessment, the GATT SPS Agreement tries to furnish
tion, where the tenor of legal practice is a far cry from the "scorched earth" methods for which
large U.S. law firms are so well known-an important point to remember, incidentally, when
considering proposals to allow private legal representation in GATE proceedings. Arguably, the
level of government legal practice in U.S. DCC litigation is quite similar to the practice in
GATT, in both respects. The decision-making capacity of U.S. courts is no doubt enhanced by
these tendencies.
110.
111.
112.
113.

1994 GATT SPS Agreement, 6 (cited in note 24).
Id. at 22.
477 U.S. 131 (1986).
Id. at 148.
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regulators with another handle on the process of risk-assessment. It
provides that members "shall avoid arbitrary or unjustifiable distinctions in the levels [of protection against risks] it considers to be appropriate in different situations, if such distinctions result in discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade. ''n 4 The drafters
apparently believed that GATT tribunals would be able to compare
levels of risk avoidance from one case to another, and thus would be
able to use the regulating government's own standards as a basis for
finding that some levels of risk avoidance were excessive.
The most difficult case for both U.S. courts and GATT tribunals will be the one in which it must be admitted that the regulation
in question does produce some possible regulatory benefit, but in
which the benefit seems clearly too small to justify the cost in terms of
trade restriction. This is the type of case in which the term
"balancing" can be applied correctly and in which the greatest objection may be raised against judicial intrusion into the political process.
A ruling that a regulatory benefit is too small to justify the cost of the
trade restriction usually will be challenged as an usurpation of the
government's political functions. Arguably, such a decision was made
by the panel convened under the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement
in the second Salmon and Herring case, when the panel ruled that
the regulatory gain of a one hundred percent landing requirement
would not have been large enough, compared to less trade-restrictive
alternatives, to justify the commercial burden if that commercial
burden had been placed on Canadian buyers of fish." 5 The decision
has already been criticized on these grounds.1 6 It remains to be seen
114. 1994 GATT SPS Agreement, 20 (cited in note 24).
115. In re Canada'sLanding Requirements, 12 Int'l Trade Reporter Decisions 1026 at 11
7.09, 7.10 and 7.35 to 7.38. The ultimate issue being decided by the panel could be described as
one of motive, in formal rather than historical terms. An earlier GATT decision had interpreted
GATT Article XX(g) as covering measures "primarily aimed at" conservation, see Canada:

Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring and Salmon, BISD, 35th Supp. 98, 4.6
(1989). The panel in this case applied the "primarily aimed at" test as follows:
Mhe Panel concluded that in determining whether the Canadian landing requirement would have been adopted for conservation reasons alone, the central issue
was whether the conservation benefits of the landing requirement would have been
large enough to justify imposing the commercial inconvenience in question. To comply
with the trade neutrality required by Article XX(g), the issue must be posed in terms of
whether Canada would have adopted the landing requirement if that measure had required an equivalent number of Canadian buyers to land and unload elsewhere than at
their intended destination.
In re Canada'sLandingRequirements, 12 Intl Trade Reporter Decisions 1026 at 7.10.
116. See David A. Wirth, The Role of Science in the Uruguay Round and NAFTA Trade
Disciplines, 27 Cornell Int'l L. J. _ (forthcoming) (taking the view that the panel improperly
substituted its own conclusions as to the statistical necessity of a 100% sample for the
conclusions of Canadian government scientists).
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whether a tribunal constituted under the GATT itself would construe
its mandate to authorize such candidly expressed judgments.
The allocation of the burden of proof in a particular case will
have a substantial impact on the actual difficulty of making these
decisions. It requires a rather strong case for a tribunal to state, on
its own authority, that a trade-restricting measure produces no regulatory benefit. But, if the measure in question is prima facie a violation of GATT or the DCC, the tribunal will be able to express the
same conclusion by finding that the government has failed to demonstrate the regulatory purpose to the tribunal's satisfaction.
Another issue that cuts across the difficulties of assessing
regulatory benefits is whether the tribunal will articulate its decision
in terms of cost-benefit analysis, or in terms of protectionist motive.
In the GATT context, each standard has its advantages and disadvantages. In cases in which a zero-benefit finding is possible, a cost-benefit decision that stresses the lack of any justification is probably the
cleanest. The same zero-benefit finding also could support a decision
in terms of protectionist motive, but a decision based on motive probably will draw objections from national governments that do not appreciate having their integrity questioned. As a practical matter, of
course, the community of member governments will react more aggressively against the violator if it is persuaded of actual bad faith.
When there is some small but inadequate amount of regulatory
gain, a GATT finding of violation that sounds like a cost-benefit
analysis will draw the heaviest criticism, for it will sound like secondguessing the value judgments of a national government. A decision
that uses the same evidence to support a finding of protectionist
purpose may to some extent avoid that objection, albeit at the expense
of eliciting another objection against impugning the motives of a client
government. Interestingly, the second Salmon and Herring decision
was articulated partly in terms of purpose, albeit not enough to
escape criticism for second-guessing. 117
Despite the obvious hazards of decisions as to purpose or motive, the GATT does have one frequently employed legal standard that
seems to legitimize some consideration of the governmental purpose
behind a measure. The preamble to GATT Article XX calls for rejection of regulatory justifications that are found to be a "disguised restriction on international trade." Although the word "disguise" can be
viewed as an objective criterion merely connoting the inadequacy of a
regulatory justification in cost-benefit terms, its more literal meaning
117. See notes 115-16 and accompanying text.
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suggests a conclusion about purpose-about a disguised real purpose
behind a false disguised purpose. 118
The prohibition against
"disguised restrictions" seems to have gained even greater currency
recently, having been employed again in several new Uruguay Round
agreements." 9 It is not surprising to find governments expressing
legal standards in terms of the real purpose behind regulatory
measures, because that, in fact, is what they are thinking about when
they see trade-restricting regulatory measures. They readily perceive
the protectionist motives behind such measures even though they
certainly would not welcome tribunals examining their own behavior
on that ground. The presence of these mixed attitudes present a
delicate challenge for GATT tribunals.
The Supreme Court has had similar difficulties in dealing with
DCC cases involving potential (but speculative) safety benefits.
Kassel v. ConsolidatedFreightways Corp.120 involved an Iowa truck
regulation. Unlike other states in the central part of the country,
Iowa prohibited the use of certain kinds of trucks, specifically 65-foot
combination trailers in which a two-axle truck pulls a single-axle
trailer, which, in turn, pulls a single-axle dolly and a second singleaxle trailer. Companies wishing to use 65-foot doubles for crosscountry trips were required to route them around Iowa or detach the
trailers and ship them through separately, or, alternatively, to use the
smaller trucks permitted under Iowa law. The total added costs to
trucking companies was about $12 million per year. 2'
The Justices were unable to agree on an analytic approach in
Kassel. Justice Powell's plurality opinion applied a balancing test and
focused on the dubious benefits of the Iowa law.122 The trial court
found convincing evidence that the 65-foot combinations were at least
as safe on interstate highways as the shorter trucks allowed by Iowa
law. 123 The plurality's deference to the state was reduced because
118. This nuance was relied on in the second Salmon andHerringdecision, In re Canada's
Landing Requirements, 12 Int'l Trade Reporter Decisions 1026 at
7.11 (stating, "[t]he
preamble to GATT Article XX, which expressly prohibits 'disguised' restrictions on international
trade, is an acknowledgment by the Parties that they will submit the purposes of traderestricting conservation measures to third-party scrutiny"). For another view of this provision,
see the two GATT panel rulings cited in note 100.
119. The term has been adopted as a legal standard in: (1) in Article 3 of the TRIPS
Agreement, cited as Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, in 1994 GATT FinalAct, I-A2C (cited in note 5); (2) in
Article XIV of the GATS (cited in note 93); and (3) paragraphs 7 and 20 of the 1994 GATT SPS
Agreement (cited in note 24).
120. 450 U.S. 662 (1981).
121. Id. at 674.
122. Id. at 671.
123. Id. at 668.
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several exemptions insured that the burden of the law fell disproportionately on out-of-state shippers. One exemption was for agricultural vehicles; the other for cities bordering on states that allowed 65foot twins. Justices Brennan and Marshall, however, rejected even
this limited use of a balancing test, and instead focused on evidence of
discriminatory intent.14 A statute eliminating the Iowa ban was vetoed by the governor, not on safety grounds, but because allowing the
trucks would "basically [open] our state to literally thousands and
thousands more trucks per year."125 Justice Brennan found this to be
an impermissible effort to shift the costs of trucking (including accidents) to neighboring states. 26 In dissent, then-Justice Rehnquist
argued that some plausible safety benefits might be present and that
27
the purported existence of discriminatory intent was irrelevant.
The analytic difficulties presented by Kassel and Salmon and
Herring are, in some sense, typical of this entire area. We have no
"quick fix" to propose for the hard cases. We somewhat gingerly attempted that task in an earlier version of this article, but are now
convinced that the effort was misplaced. The general problem we are
addressing has resisted the best efforts of the Supreme Court (for over
150 years), GATT tribunals, international negotiators, and a host of
talented legal scholars. The reason, we believe, is that in some ultimate sense the problem is unsolvable. Taken to their logical conclusion, either free trade or local autonomy could virtually eliminate the
other, and negotiating a workable border between the two depends as
much on history, politics, and local terrain as on any overarching
vision. No matter how a legal test is articulated, it cannot satisfactorily resolve the tensions between local autonomy and free trade in all
conceivable cases. In the end, the law must have a certain irreducible
messiness in dealing with such fundamental tensions.
Messiness is not, however, the same as chaos. Both the DCC
and GATT do have fairly adequate ways of dealing with facially discriminatory measures. Both place a heavy burden on the regulating
government to justify the measure (though the GATT experience
suggests that the articulated DCC standard may be too high). Both
run into trouble with facially neutral measures, which run the spectrum from devious bad faith on one hand and innocent run-of-themine regulation on the other. Even here, however, there are a considerable number of easy cases. The difficult cases are those in between
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id. at 679-87 (Brennan, Marshall, J.J., concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 684.
Id. at 686.
Id. at 704-05 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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-where a clear but limited benefit exists, where the benefit is hard to
predict (perhaps because of scientific uncertainty), or where assessing
the benefit requires a difficult, and possibly culturally based, value
judgment. The U.S. courts are currently trying to sort their way
through these cases by means of a poorly articulated "discrimination"
test, seemingly moving away from the Pike-type balancing text.
GATT tribunals are just now beginning to confront the harder cases.
Particularly in these difficult cases, common sense tells us that most
tribunals are likely to be strongly affected by their perceptions about
the motive of the government that enacted the measure. 128
Kassel suggests another argument against sharply distinguishing between discriminatory intent and effect. When the Iowa regulation was originally adopted, discrimination seemed not to have played
an important role. By the time of the governor's veto message, which
was avowedly discriminatory, the original rationale seemed to have
evaporated. As then-Justice Rehnquist complained in dissent, it
seems odd to say that the original ban became unconstitutional solely
because of what happened during an unsuccessful effort to change
it.129
Moreover, in many cases where discriminatory motivation is
even stronger, there will be less evidence of it, because no one will
even attempt to pass repeal legislation. If the purported rationale of a
law has evaporated but the measure continues to burden commerce,
we could, reasonably but fictitiously, impute a discriminatory motive
to the legislature's failure to repeal. Or we could simply say that the
law fails even the most lenient balancing test, because its benefits are
illusory. We see no reason to agonize over the difference in these
formulations.13° The conclusion that protectionism was, in fact, the
purpose of the government is the most powerful possible condemnation. In reality, it will be the thought running through almost everybody's mind, whether the conclusion is reached because the purported
benefits seem so minuscule or because of actual evidence of historical
128. As applied to a collective group like a legislature, "intent" is to some degree a legal fic-

tion, since groups do not actually have mental states of their own, and it is highly unlikely that
every legislator (or even every majority legislator) ever possessed an identical mental state.

When we talk about protectionist motivation, what we really mean is that protectionist effect
played a stronger causative role in the passage of legislation than its purported regulatory benefits, and one reason for believing that is often the weakness of those benefits. Even if some Iowa
legislators in Kassel had the impression that the legislation increased safety, it seems unlikely
such tenuous evidence would have been enough to result in legislation, except for its protection-

ist attractions.
129. Kassel, 450 U.S. at 705.
130. One formulation alludes to the political dynamics preventing repeal, and the other
focuses on the regulation itself. But they ultimately both reveal that the regulation is outside
the bounds of normal legislative practice for domestic industries.
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motive. Concerns about government motive may not be fully articulated in the final opinion. Even the U.S. courts have sometimes
treated the subject of legislative motive gingerly (as illustrated by the
plurality opinion in Kassel). The GATT tribunals have a weaker institutional position and even more reason to be wary. Overt or not,
consideration of motive seems inevitable, however, and a more explicit
treatment of the issue by tribunals probably would be helpful.
Despite the great conceptual difficulties posed by regulatory
trade barriers, both U.S. and international tribunals seem largely to
have struggled their way to defensible results. Because of the difficulty of constructing a clean doctrinal solution, the quality of the
process, and that of the decision makers, is and will remain critical.

